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0531上海管理论坛第309期(周伟华教授,浙江大学管理学院)

Created Date 5/28/2018    View Numbers  239 Return    
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    目:Guarantor Financing in a Four-party Supply Chain with Leadership Influence

人:周伟华,浙江大学管理学院教授

人:  璐,上海大学管理学院教授

    间:2018531日(周四),下午14:00

    点:校本部东区管理学院420

主办单位:上海大学管理学院、上海大学管理学院青年教师联谊会

         

演讲人简介:

香港科技大学工业工程与物流管理博士,浙江大学管理学院教授、博士生导师,斯坦福大学访问学者,教育部新世纪优秀人才,浙江大学求是青年学者,浙江省之江青年学者。

现任浙江大学管理学院副院长、浙江大学数据分析和管理国际研究中心主任。

长期从事决策分析与运营管理研究,相关研究成果在国际管理科学顶级刊物《Operations Research》发表,在国内外发表学术论文20余篇。主持国家自然科学基金项目4项,国家部委、各级政府及企业项目20余项。

 

演讲内容简介:

Recent years have seen guarantor financing growing rapidly in developing countries, where small firms do not have sufficient creditworthiness to secure bank loans by themselves. However, to date, no paper has studied the efficacy of guarantor financing in a supply chain context. This paper investigates both manufacturer guarantor financing (MGF) and third-party logistics (3PL) guarantor financing (LGF) in a four-party supply chain, featuring a manufacturer, a 3PL, and a retailer, and a bank. Either the manufacturer or 3PL can act as the guarantor of the retailer when it applies credit from the bank. Two different leadership structures are investigated: simultaneous game where the manufacturer and 3PL simultaneously make their decisions and manufacturer leadership Stackelberg game where the manufacturer and 3PL sequentially make their decisions.

Under the simultaneous game, all firms prefer guarantor financing compared to traditional bank financing when the supply chain is cost efficient and expected efficient sales under guarantor financing is attractive . Furthermore, the retailer and the supply chain have no preference between MGF and LGF; while both manufacturer and 3PL prefer the other to be the guarantor.  Under the Stackelberg game, all firms still prefer guarantor financing with conditions. Meanwhile, all firms including 3PL itself prefer 3PL to be the guarantor. Furthermore, our analysis shows that a longer decision hierarchy (i.e., a Stackelberg game rather than a simultaneous game) can be more effective for all firms under guarantor financing with conditions, while under bank financing all firms except the manufacturer prefer the simultaneous game. By further analyzing different cost structures, pricing mechanism and level of initial capital, we find most of the conclusion mentioned above remains true but with more sophisticated conditions.  All these findings enhance our understanding of the value of guarantor financing in a supply chain.

 

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